Matter as Information. Quantum Information as Matter by Penchev, Vasil
Matter as Information. Quantum Information as
Matter
Vasil Penchev
1. The thesis
The concept of matter in physics can be considered as a generalised
form of information, that of quantum information involved through
quantum mechanics. Furthermore, the concept of information can
unify concrete and abstract objects while the notions of matter and
energy in physics demark them. Thus, information can be seen as
the universal substance of the world and therefore, as the relevant
generalisation of the notions of mass and energy in physics referring
only to the world of concrete objects.
2. A few preliminary notes
The first one refers to quantum information: the conception of quan-
tum information was introduced in the theory of quantum informa-
tion studying the phenomena of entanglement in quantum mechanics:
the entanglement was theoretically forecast in the famous papers of
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen1 and independently by Schrödinger2
deducing it from Hilbert space, on which is based the mathemati-
cal formalism of quantum mechanics. However, the former three
demonstrated the forecast phenomenon as the proof of the alleged
‘incompleteness of quantum mechanics’. John Bell3 deduced a suffi-
cient condition as an experimentally verifiable criterion in order to
1 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935, 777.
2 Schrödinger 1935, 807.
3 Bell 1964, 195.
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distinguish classical from quantum correlation (entanglement). As-
pect, Grangier, and Roger4 confirmed experimentally the existence of
quantum correlations exceeding the upper limit of all possible clas-
sical correlations. The theory of quantum information has thrived
since the end of the last century in the areas of the quantum computer,
quantum communication, and quantum cryptography.
Quantum information can be considered as a quantity measured
in qubits: the notion of quantum bit (or ‘qubit’) underlies that of
quantum information: ‘Qubit’ is: α|0〉 + β|1〉 where α, β are two
complex numbers such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 and |0〉, |1〉 are any two
orthonormal vectors (e.g. the orthonormal bases of any two subspaces)
in any vector space (e.g. Hilbert space, Euclidean space, etc.).
A qubit is isomorphic to a unit ball under the following conditions:
A qubit is equivalently representable as a unit ball in Euclidean space
and two points, the one chosen within the ball, and the other being
the orthogonal projection on its surface.
Consequently, the qubit links the Hilbert space of quantum me-
chanics to the Minkowski space of special relativity and even to the
pseudo-Riemannian space of general relativity (the latter by the addi-
tional mediation of the concept of entanglement). The ‘Banach-Tarski
paradox’5 connects the axiom of choice and the unit-ball representa-
tion of a qubit.
Hilbert space can be represented as a ‘tape’ of qubits: Given any
point in the complex Hilbert space as a vector C1, C2, . . . Cn, C(n+1),. . . ,
one can replace any successive couple of its components such as (C1,
C2, C2, C3,. . . C(n-1), Cn. . . ) with a single corresponding qubit Q1,
Q2,. . . , Qn, Q(n+1), . . . such that:
αn =
Cn
(+)
√|Cn|2 + |Cn+1|2
βn =
Cn
(+)
√|Cn|2 + |Cn+1|2
4 Aspect, Grangier, and Roger 1981, 460; Aspect, Grangier, and Roger 1982, 91.
5 Banach and Tarski 1924, 244.
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if Cn, C(n+1) are not both 0. However if both are 0 one needs to
conventionally add the centre (αn=0, βn=0) to conserve the mapping
of Hilbert space and an infinite qubit tape to be one-to-one.
A bit and a qubit can be compared: then if any bit is an elementary
binary choice between two disjunctive options usually designated by
‘0’ and ‘1’, any qubit is a choice between a continuum of disjunctive
options as many (or ‘much’) as the points of the surface of the unit
ball. Thus the concept of choice is the core of computation and infor-
mation. It is what can unify the classical and quantum case, and the
demarcation between them is the bound between a finite vs. infinite
number of the alternatives of the corresponding choice.
A Turing machine can be juxtaposed with a quantum Turing ma-
chine: the quantum Turing machine processes quantum information
correspondingly qubit by qubit serially, but in parallel within any
qubit: the axiom of choice formalises that parallel processing as the
choice of the result. Even the operations on a qubit can be the same as
on a bit. The only difference should be for the command ‘write/ read’:
It should be a value of either a binary (finite) or an infinite set.
Quantum information can be considered as the information of an
infinite set as an ordinal and as complexity: the quantum information
introduced by quantum mechanics is equivalent to that generalisation
of the classical information from finite to infinite series or collections.
Indeed information can be interpreted as the number of choices neces-
sary for an ordering of some item from another ordering of the same
item or from the absence of ordering to be reached. Then the quantity
of information is the quantity of choices measured in the units of ele-
mentary choice. The quantity of quantum information is the ordinal
corresponding to the infinite series in question.
The second preliminary note refers to the conception of an ‘ordi-
nal number’ in set theory and its application in quantum mechanics.
There are two well-known common definitions of ‘ordinal’: both defi-
nitions of an ‘ordinal number’6 are interpretable in terms of quantum
mechanics.
The Cantor-Russell definition is admissible as the ordinals are
small: ‘ω’ is enough of a limit. The ordinal defined in Cantor-Russell
6 The first one: Cantor 1897, 207; Whitehead and Russell 1927, 18; the second one:
Neumann 1923, 199.
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generates a statistical ensemble while that in Neumann, a well-ordering.
Both correspond one-to-one to a coherent state as one and the same
quantity of quantum information contained in it.
The interpretation of the two ‘kinds’ of ordinal numbers in terms of
quantum mechanics is as follows: the relation between the statistical
ensemble and the single and unknown well-ordering is the relation
between an ordinal defined correspondingly in Cantor-Russell or in
Neumann. The ordinal defined in Neumann should be interpreted as
a representative of ‘determinism’ for any statistical ensemble corre-
sponding one-to-one to an ordinal defined in Cantor-Russell. However,
this representative exists only ‘purely’ for it is a mapping of a coherent
state necessarily requiring the axiom of choice.
The third preliminary note concerns the concept of the ‘length
of now’ after de Broglie. The ‘length of now’ of any quantum entity
can be defined as the period of the de Broglie wave,7 which can be
associated with that quantum entity: thus the ‘length of now’ should
be reciprocal to the energy (mass) of the quantum entity: then the
‘length of now’ of the device should be a randomly chosen point from
the segment of the ‘length of now’ of the quantum entity therefore
including the future and the past of the apparatus uniformly.
3. Mass, energy and information as linked physical
quantities
Contemporary physics introduces the notion of matter and quantity
of mass as a form of energy according to Einstein’s famous equation
E=mc2. The physical world and all entities within it (the concrete
objects) share that quantity of matter. However, there exist abstract
objects, which do not belong to the physical world. Thus, the physical
concept of mass does not refer to them. Consequently, that quantity of
mass is the demarcation between those two worlds: that of the concrete
objects and that of the abstract ones. Any entity should belong to either
one or the other.
All abstract objects share a common quantity, that of information.
It can be defined in different ways, partly equivalent to each other. It
can be interpreted also as the complexity of a given abstract object,
7 Broglie 1925, 22.
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e.g. as the length of the shortest algorithm (or the number of the
corresponding Turing machine), by which the object at issue can be
constructed.8
The dimensionless physical quantity of thermodynamic entropy
shares the same or similar mathematical formula as information. How-
ever, it always refers to some statistical ensembles of material (ener-
getic) entities and thus the demarcation between mass (energy) and
information is conserved though the concept of information unifies
both concrete and abstract objects. Information in both cases can be
considered as a quantity describing the degree of ordering (or disorder-
ing, or complexity) of any collection either of abstract or of concrete
objects.
Furthermore, any physical entity shares quantum information. The
concept of quantum information introduced by quantum mechanics al-
lows even more: any physical entity to be interpreted as some nonzero
quantity of quantum information, which can be seen as that general-
ization of information, which is relevant to infinite collections for the
classically defined information can refer only to finite ones.
Then the following hypothesis can be offered: the quantities of
mass and energy are interpretable as some nonzero amount of quan-
tum information. Thus the demarcation between concrete and abstract
objects can be understood as the boundary between infinity and finite-
ness in a rigorous and even mathematical sense. This allows for dif-
fusing concepts between the philosophy of mathematics and quantum
mechanics, on the one hand, and ontology, on the other hand.
Mass, energy, and matter can be considered forms of information.
The core is the following: the physical concepts of mass, energy and
matter are interpreted as the notion of information in the case of
quantum information, i.e. as the information in an infinite collec-
tion. Furthermore, the mathematical analysis of the relation between
infinity and finiteness can be transferred to elucidate the essence of
matter even in an ontological sense. Mass and energy can be referred
to the complexity of infinite sets. Energy (and therefore mass) can
be interpreted as the change of the complexity of a relevant infinite
set thus: Energy is the change of that transfinite ordinal representing
the complexity per unit of transfinite well-ordering. That unit of the
8 Kolmogorov 1968, 662.
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number of sells necessary for that transfinite well-ordering should be
a unit of time. The change of the transfinite ordinal number should be
the corresponding change of probability due to the change of a wave
function.
4. Choice and information
Choice should be put in the base of information. The notion of choice
grounds that of information. The latter can be seen as the quantity
of elementary choices in units of choice, which are also units of in-
formation. The generalisation of information through the boundary
of infinity as quantum information requires the axiom of choice9 to
legitimate the notion of choice as to infinity.
The axiom of choice applied to quantum mechanics implies quan-
tum invariance in relation to the choice in the following sense: a few
theorems10 deduce from the mathematical formalism of Hilbert space
that no hidden variable and thus no well-ordering is allowed for any
coherent state in quantum mechanics.
However, the latter is well-ordered after measurement and thus
needs the well-ordering theorem equivalent to the axiom of choice.
The epistemological equivalence of a quantum system before and
after measurement forces the invariance to the axiom of choice. That
invariance is shared by the Hilbert space formalism. This fact can be
called quantum invariance as to quantum mechanics.
Choice can be generalised to infinity: one can demonstrate that
quantum mechanics involves and even develops implicitly the concept
of choice as to infinity, on the one hand, and set theory (the so-called
paradox of Skolem11 based on the axiom of choice) does the same,
on the other hand. Thus the understanding of matter as information
elucidates how choice underlies matter and even ontology at all.
The concept of quantum information can be introduced in different
ways: one of them defines it by means of Hilbert space and thus any
point in it which is equivalent to a wave function, i.e. to a state of some
9 Zermelo 1904, 514.
10 Neumann 1932, 167; Kochen and Specker 1968, 59.
11 Turing 1937, 97.
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quantum system, can be considered as a certain value of the quantity
of quantum information.
A Turing machine can refer to a quantum computer under certain
conditions: that visualisation allows for highlighting the fundamental
difference between the Turing machine and the quantum computer12:
the choice of an element of an uncountable set requires the axiom of
choice necessarily. The axiom of choice being non-constructive is the
relevant reference frame to the concept of quantum algorithm: the lat-
ter, in turn, involves a constructive process of solving or computation
having an infinite and even uncountable number of steps therefor.
Information can be defined as the number of primary choices:
the concept of information can be interpreted as the quantity of the
number of primary choices. Furthermore, the Turing machine either
classical or quantum as a model links computation to information
directly: the quantity of information can be thought as the sum of the
change bit by bit or qubit by qubit, i.e. as the change of a number
written either by two or by infinitely many digits.
The following equating should hold: A cell of a (quantum) Turing
tape = a qubit = a choice of (quantum) information = an ‘infinite digit’.
The ‘leap’ from information to quantum information is through the
boundary of infinity: the generalisation from information to quantum
information can be interpreted as the corresponding generalisation of
‘choice’: from the choice between two (or any finite number of) dis-
junctive alternatives to infinitely many (and even ‘much’) alternatives.
Thus the distinction between the classical and quantum case can be
limited within any cell of an algorithm or (qu)bit of information.
5. Abstraction and choice
Abstraction and choice are implicitly defined in set theory: the link
between abstraction and choice in the foundation of set theory can
distinguish unambiguously the ‘good’ principles of abstraction from
the ‘bad’ ones. The good abstraction is always a choice in the sense of
set theory; or in other words, that abstraction, to which a choice does
not correspond, is a ‘bad abstraction’ implying contradictions.
12 Deutsch 1985, 97; Deutsch 1989, 73; Yao 1993, 352.
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The abstraction as a generalisation can be compared with the choice
by means of two examples: abstraction was initially allowed to be un-
restricted in ‘naïve set theory’, therefore admitting a lot of paradoxes.
It was Zermelo13 who offered the relevant way out restricting the
abstraction in set theory in fact by means of choice: a set is not only
the abstraction of its elements, but it can also be chosen from another
set.
Linnebo’s concept of ‘COLAPSE’14 and Popper’s principle of falsi-
fiability15 are two more possible examples of the complement of the
generalisation by the relevant choice of the abstracted.
The axiom of choice can be referred to the axiom scheme of spec-
ification: the concept of abstraction or that of choice in set theory is
fundamental (like that of point in geometry) and cannot be defined
rigorously otherwise than contextually and indirectly by the axioms
in set theory: as the axiom of choice can correspond to ‘choice’, so the
axiom scheme of specification, to ‘abstraction‘. Their intuitions are the
opportunities accordingly for an element to be chosen from a set or all
elements of a set to be specified by a single logical function.
A few words can be said about the logical equivalence of choice
and abstraction: one can designate as the ‘name’ or ‘natural name’ of
a set that logical function, which is equivalent to it according to the
corresponding axiom (or axiom scheme) of abstraction in set theory.
Then, what is the relation between the name and the choice of one and
the same set? Can a set be chosen without having any name? Or vice
versa: can a set be named without being chosen? One can suggest the
equivalence of the name and the choice of one and the same set for
this seems intuitively justified.
An example can be given by the ‘Gödel first incompleteness the-
orem’; furthermore,‘This set has this name’ should be a decidable
proposition. However, the so-called Gödel first incompleteness the-
orem, ‘Satz VI’16 implies that there are such sets and such names,
about which that proposition is not decidable if the conditions of the
validity of the theorem are satisfied. This implies that the name of
13 Zermelo 1908, 261.
14 Linnebo 2010, 144.
15 Popper 1935, 13.
16 Gödel 1931, 187.
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any set is imposed with suitable restrictions, which should exclude
the application of Gödel’s theorem: one can choose as a name any
proposition out of its conditions. One believes that this can be avoided
by the restriction in the corresponding postulate in set theory for the
names to be finite or to consist of a finite set of free variables. However,
what about the sets having no finite name, but possessing an infinite
name? Is there at least one set of that kind? Obviously, yes, there is:
e.g. any transcendental number without any special designation like
‘pi’, ‘e’, etc. One needs an actual infinite set, e.g. that of its digits, in
order to construct its name.
However, the restriction of the name in the corresponding axiom
scheme in set theory about abstraction should exclude it thus saving
the theory from the Gödel undecidable propositions as names of sets.
The axiom of choice would distinguish unambiguously even be-
tween them: the transcendental number being single can be chosen
while any set specified by some undecidable proposition cannot be
chosen.
Furthermore, abstraction and choice can be defined in terms of
quantum mechanics, too: ‘choice’ is then the relation of a coherent
state (or superposition) and a measured value of it (or an element of
the corresponding statistical ensemble).
The reverse relation (either of a single element or of the whole sta-
tistical ensemble) to the coherent state can be accordingly interpreted
as that ‘abstraction’ in terms of quantum mechanics.
Both abstraction and well-ordering may be referred to quantum
mechanics as coherence and de-coherence: any well-ordering can
be considered as an ordered series of choices. Thus a mapping of a
coherent state into a statistical ensemble can be interpreted in terms
both of transfinite ordinals and wave functions as the quantity of
quantum information contained in it. Furthermore, the quantity of
quantum information should be invariant both to abstraction and to
choice (as they are defined in quantum mechanics above) after the
wave functions (points in Hilbert space) and the transfinite ordinals
are mapped one-to-one into each other.
‘Hume’s principle’ is introduced as a fundamental logical principle:
in fact the so-called principle of Hume is suggested by a contemporary
17
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logician, George Boolos.17 Its sense seems quite simple and obvious:
the enumeration does not change the number of the enumerated items
whatever they are. The enumeration cannot change information. Thus
the number or the information should be invariant to whether the
objects are abstract or concrete.
Or in other words, any number is the abstraction of all sets having
the same number of elements, whatever these elements or sets are.
‘Hume’s principle’ generalised in terms of quantum mechanics should
sound thus: in the quantum principle of Hume, ‘Gs’ should be inter-
preted as some ‘many’ and ‘Fs’ as some ‘much’ of one and the same set
or abstraction.
Indeed the axiom scheme in set theory about abstraction can be
interpreted as a scheme of tautologies, in which each name designates
a set as a whole, i.e. as a ‘much’, while the collection of elements
designates as a ‘many’ consisting of separated individuals.
Abstract and concrete objects can be considered as kinds of sets:
the objects either abstract or concrete, can be unified as some homoge-
nous plurality and thus as a whole. Furthermore, that whole can be
considered a new abstract object. Thus, concrete and abstract objects
can be opposed as a ‘many’ and the whole of it, or as a ‘many’ and
a ‘much’ of one and the same quality. That intuition addresses the
concept of ‘set’ utilised in set theory.
The quantum ‘principle of Hume’ means, properly, the conserva-
tion of quantum information after de-coherence (‘choice’) or coherence
(‘abstraction’).
6. Conclusions
Any physical process is a quantum computation: a quantum computer
can be equivalently represented by a quantum Turing machine. The
quantum Turing machine is equivalent to Hilbert space. Quantum
mechanics states that any physical state or its change is a self-adjoint
operator in Hilbert space as any physical system can be considered as a
quantum one. Consequently all physical processes can be interpreted
as the calculation of a single computer, and thus the universe being as
it.
17 Boolos 1987, 3.
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Any wave function is a value of quantum information: any wave
function can be represented as an ordered series of qubits enumerated
by the positive integers. Just as an ordering of bits can represent a
value of classical information, that series of qubits, equivalent to a
wave function, represents a value of quantum information. One can
think of the qubits of the series as a special kind of digits: ‘infinite
digits’.
As a binary digit can accept two values, that ‘infinite digit’ should
accept an infinite number of values.
All physical processes are informational: quantum mechanics is
the universal doctrine about the physical world and any physical
process can be interpreted as a quantum one. Any quantum process is
informational in terms of a generalised kind of information: quantum
information. Consequently, all physical processes are informational in
the above sense.
Quantum information is the real fundament of the world: indeed,
all physical states in the world are wave functions and thus they are
different values of quantum information. All physical quantities in
the world are certain kind of changes of wave functions and thus
of quantum information. Consequently, one can certainly state that
the physical world consists only of quantum information: it is the
substance of the physical world, its ‘matter’.
Information is a bridge between two groups of fundamental philo-
sophical concepts: the conception of information and more exactly,
quantum information unifies physics and mathematics, and thus the
material and the ideal world as well as the concrete and abstract
objects.
The ground is the choice unifying the well-ordering of the past and
the uncertainness of the future by the choice of the present. Conse-
quently, quantum information as the substance of the universe is the
mediator between totality and time, on the one hand, and the physical
world, on the other hand. Information can also be considered also as
a ‘bridge’ between the concrete and the abstract: as information is a
dimensionless quantity equally well referring both to a physical entity
and to a mathematical class, it can serve as a ‘bridge’ between physics
and mathematics and thus between the material and ideal world, be-
tween concrete and abstract objects. In fact, quantum information
being a generalised kind of information is just what allows for the
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physical and mathematical, the concrete and abstract, to be considered
as two interpretations of the underlying quantum information.
The concept of information generalised as quantum information
also generalises the concept of matter in physics as well as the cor-
responding quantities of matter and energy. Furthermore, quantum
information can be interpreted as that generalisation of information
which is applicable to infinite collections or algorithms. Thus the
fundamental properties of mass or energy shared by all in the physical
worlds turn out to be underlain by quantum information. The gap
between concrete objects (interpreted as physical ones) and abstract
objects is now bridged by the concept of information shared by both
and underlying both kinds of objects. The quantity of information
either classical (i.e. ‘finite’) or quantum (i.e. ‘infinite’) is defined in
both cases as the amount of choices and measured in units of elemen-
tary choice: correspondingly either bits or qubits. The case of infinite
choice cannot help but involve the axiom of choice and a series of
counterintuitive corollaries implied by it: One of them is the so-called
paradox of Skolem: it allows for discussing concrete and abstract ob-
jects as complementary in the sense of quantum mechanics as well as
different degrees of ‘entanglement’ between them therefore pioneering
a kind of quantum epistemology as universal.
The physical processes can be interpreted as informational, more
precisely as quantum-informational. Any wave function determines a
state of a quantum system and a state of a quantum computer defined
as a quantum Turing machine, in which all bits are simply replaced by
qubits infinitely many in general. Thus the concept of quantum infor-
mation and calculation can unify physics and mathematics, addressing
some form of neo-Pythagoreanism as the common ontological ground
of concrete objects (studied by physics) and abstract ones (studied by
mathematics).
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physics? Is matter an unpredictable flux of pure energy or an organised 
cosmos of even more basic elements? The nature of matter has been a 
central issue for philosophy since its inception. Over the course of 
centuries of debate, a wide variety of theoretical solutions have been 
proposed. Indeed, all major historical shifts of thought have prompted 
fundamental re-thinking of the nature of matter. This volume includes 
contributions on History of Contemporary Philosophy originally 
presented as individual papers at CRF 1st International Conference 
«Understanding Matter», Palermo (Italy), 10th-13th April 2014.
Contributions by: M. Balaska, R. Caldarone, M. Carapezza, G. Chiurazzi, E. 
Fugali, D. Helbig, S. Galanti Grollo, L. Gasparri, R. Lanfredini, V. Penchev, 
C. Rosciglione, K. Ruthenberg, G. Sagriotis, L. Sesta, M. Shafiei, L. Vanzago, 
R. E. Zimmermann.
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